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A safety-case approach to the ethics of autonomous vehicles
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have significant ethical and safety implications.
Questions of informed consent and risk acceptance are of primary importance, as
is an explicit identification of the ethical principles underlying these decisions. In
this paper we present a method for translating ethical imperatives into design
decisions and safety management practices. We demonstrate the use of an
assurance case structure to justify the integrity of this translation. The assurance
case combines mathematical and technical evidence with a compelling and
comprehensible argument structure, and provides a means to demonstrate that
design and safety management decisions reflect an identified ethical position.
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1. Introduction
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are increasingly being presented as the future of transport
on public roads. The worth of the Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) market
in the UK by 2035 is estimated to be 28bn (Transport Systems Catapult [TSC], 2017),
and typical estimates for the first occurrence date of fully-autonomous vehicles on UK
roads are in the mid-2020s (UK Government Department for Transport [DfT], 2015).
While such forecasts are undoubtedly optimistic, they illuminate the continuing trend
towards increased autonomy in this domain (Anderson & Anderson, 2007). Real-world
trials of AVs are also underway in several countries, including the UK ((UK
Government Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles [CCAV], 2018), (UK
Autodrive, 2017), (Venturer, 2016), (Venturer, 2017)), the US ((Waymo, 2018), (Uber,
2018)), Singapore, Japan and Europe (CCAV, 2018).
Although the technological capability to develop AV systems is developing
quickly, ethical considerations remain an important societal barrier to their acceptance
(UK Autodrive, 2017). This is exemplified by the trolley problem (Foot, 1967), which
in its original form presents an ethical dilemma in which a runaway train is on course to
kill five people. A bystander is given the choice to let the train continue on its course or
to divert it onto a different track where only one person will be killed. Although the
trolley problem is a hypothetical question only, there is mainstream public interest in
how AVs should behave in similar situations where harm to at least one person is
inevitable (MIT, 2018).
It is arguable that the trolley problem has dominated the ethical debate around
AV introduction to the exclusion of other, more nuanced, ethical considerations
(Goodall, 2016). These other considerations include the balance and types of risk
considered acceptable for AVs to present, the distribution of these risks across different
sections of society, concerns over developer culpability and liability (Anderson, Nidhi,
Stanley, Sorenson & Oluwatola, 2014), the environmental implications of AV
introduction (Fagnant & Kockelman, 2014) and the impact on transport efficiency.
In this paper we build on existing work in risk distribution ((Menon &
Alexander, 2017), (Menon, Bloomfield & Clements, 2013), (Menon & Alexander,
2018)) to present a methodology for translating from nuanced ethical considerations
into safety requirements. This translation embeds explicit ethical principles within a
structured assurance case, and uses the framework of this assurance case to
demonstrate that the safety requirements corresponding to these ethical principles are
satisfied by the AV. Structured assurance cases are well established in the area of safety
argumentation ((Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010), (Kelly & Weaver, 2004), (Hawkins,
Habli, Kelly & McDermid, 2013)) where they are used to provide a rigorous
justification of the safety of a system. Our proposed approach uses these assurance
cases within the ethical domain, using their structure to ensure that ethical principles are
described, justified and implemented within the AV design.
Our approach does not attempt to prescribe a set of recommended ethical
principles for AVs, but rather focuses on the translation of ethical principles into safety
requirements. As such, the framework we present is broadly applicable across a range of
credible ethical motivations, some of which are presented as examples in Section 5.
However, our framework does assume compliance with the UK Human Rights Act (UK
Government, 1998) and the other national implementations of the European Convention
on Human Rights. In addition, we restrict our discussion throughout this paper on AVs
which perform the whole of the driving task. These correspond to SAE Level 4 or Level
5, using the levels of automation identified and discussed in (SAE, 2018).
In Section 2 we present the ethical and safety background relevant to AVs,
highlighting where existing work does not fully facilitate transformation of ethical
concerns into safety requirements. Section 3 describes how these ethical concerns
impact our judgements around risk acceptance and risk balancing. Section 4 provides a
taxonomy of acceptable risk profiles which each represent a different ethical perspective
on risk acceptance. Section 5 shows how the risk profiles can be used to translate ethical
imperatives into specific safety requirements, using assurance case patterns to argue that
these are satisfied. Section 6 provides discussion and Section 7 concludes.
2. Background
2.1 Structured assurance cases
Within safety engineering, structured assurance cases are used to present a compelling,
credible argument that a system is safe in a given context ((Bloomfield & Bishop,
2010), (Kelly & Weaver, 2004), (Kelly, 2007), (Object Management Group [OMG],
2019)). An assurance case consists of a set of claims about the system, such as a claim
that all hazards have been identified, or that the failure rate of the system is below a
certain threshold. These claims are supported with evidence, and with an argument that
the evidence is sufficient to provide confidence in that claim. Claims can be broken
down into sub-claims, and typically several pieces of evidence are needed to provide
confidence that a claim has been satisfied.
Assurance cases allow safety management decisions to be interrogated (e.g. by a
regulator) and defended. The adequacy of the argument is critical, and assurance cases
typically attempt to satisfy certain principles within their overall argument construction.
Arguments built on these principles all have certain aspects in common, and as such the
principles provide a template pattern, or a recommended method of constructing the
argument in order to minimise the chances of introducing a logical, technical or
semantic error. For example, safety standards within the defence domain (UK Ministry
of Defence [MOD], 2017) require that arguments in assurance cases demonstrate
satisfaction of the following four principles:
1. Safety requirements are defined to address the system’s contribution to hazards
2. The intent of the safety requirements shall be maintained throughout
requirements decomposition
3. The safety requirements shall be satisfied
4. Hazardous behaviour of the system shall be identified and mitigated
When constructing the argument, developers can define claims which
correspond to each of these principles. (In practice, a number of claims might be
required in order to support each principle, and each claim might also support multiple
principles.) A significant body of work already exists around the construction and
discussion of template argument patterns, with common questions being focused on
how to create template patterns which eliminate logical fallacies, unjustified
assumptions, weakened conclusions or other similar faults ((Bloomfield & Bishop,
2010) (Kelly, 2007), (Hawkins, Habli, Kolovos, Paige & Kelly, 2015), (Common
Criteria, 2007)).
2.2 Ethics and AVs
While there is currently no regulatory or legislative barrier to the testing and
deployment of AVs in the UK (DfT, 2015), there are significant ethical and safety
challenges. AVs have the potential to cause harm in all the ways that traditional cars do
(e.g. collisions, harmful emissions, impacts on road efficiency), as well as via novel
pathways. For example, cyber-security is a significant issue (DfT, 2017), (UK
Autodrive, 2018) as AVs are vulnerable to being controlled by malicious third parties in
a way that traditional vehicles are not.
More generally, a number of high-profile accidents (albeit at lower SAE levels)
have illustrated some of the safety and technological challenges related to automation of
the driving task. Misidentification of a pedestrian coupled with the removal of
emergency braking resulted in a fatal accident for Uber in Tempe in 2018 (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2018), while a user relying on the automation
beyond its stated capabilities led to a fatal Tesla accident in 2016 (NTSB, 2017).
Factors in other fatal Tesla accidents have been identified as misidentification of road
features and road blockages by the AV (NTSB, 2018b), (Boudette, 2016).
This potential for fatal accidents illuminates the ethical challenges connected
with the operation of AVs. These accidents affect the general public’s perception of AV
risk as well as giving rise to discussions around the adequacy of mechanisms in place to
reduce this risk. Such discussions must consider the selection of risk criteria, the
acceptability of residual risk associated with the AV and the extent to which users have
consented to bear this risk. Existing work on ethical design standards, such as (IEEE
Global, 2018), examines high-level ethical concerns by looking at the societal benefits
and concerns around autonomous systems in general. Other work, such as (UK
Autodrive, 2017b), focuses on the different ethical factors with the potential to
influence the eventual behaviour of an AV.
Some of these ethical factors are the “human values”, such as the AV
developers’ desire for fairness and the AV passengers’ desire for personal autonomy
(Thornton, 2018). The first of these could lead to developers preferring algorithms
which prioritise polite and non-aggressive behaviour of the AV, while the second could
lead to implementation of customised AV behaviours which allow passengers to choose
the preferred style of driving (Kuderer, Gulati & Burgard, 2015). This has ethical
implications in itself, in that the developers may choose to limit the choices of driving
style to those which are non-aggressive, thereby depriving the passenger of some
personal autonomy.
In addition to these “human values”, there are less altruistic factors which may
also influence the eventual behaviour of an AV. Self-interest and commercial
competitiveness are likely to be relevant, given the results presented in (UK Autodrive,
2017b), which identify that potential customers prefer the AV to prioritise the safety of
its passengers over any third parties. More generally, self-interest could lead to
developers making choices about the AV behaviour specifically to reduce their
culpability in the case of an accident (Shalev-Schwartz, Shammah & Shashua, 2017)
In terms of the behaviours which result from ethical choices, (Gips, 1995) and
(Wallach & Allen, 2008) explore how the design of an autonomous system is affected
by the extent to which ethical reasoning and capacity is embedded within it. (Dennis,
Fisher, Slavkoviv & Webster, 2004) presents formal verification that a high-level
ethical policy is satisfied by the eventual behaviour of the system. A general
architecture for a robot capable of modelling its own actions using simulation and
predicting the ethical consequences of these is discussed in (Winfield, Blum & Liu,
2014) and (Vanderelst & Winfield, 2018) while (Arkin, Ulam & Wagner, 2012)
considers simulation of a robot with an ethical framework.
2.2.1 Revisiting the trolley problem
Much existing public discussion of AV ethics focuses on the trolley problem, positing a
situation in which an AV must choose which of two pedestrians to collide with. The
trolley problem is often cited in public media as an illustration of AV safety issues, and
public debate is typically focused around this problem or equivalent variants (MIT,
2018). However, real-world instances of the trolley problem are rare, and as typically
discussed it assumes a level of engineering capability that is infeasible (UK Autodrive,
2017b), (Goodall, 2016).
A more realistic variant of the trolley problem considers how the AV can act in
any given situation to minimise the overall risk (UK Autodrive, 2017b). This requires
the AV to accurately estimate its own operational capacity and to adjust its behaviour
accordingly (Nilsson, 2018). For example, in (Lin, 2015) the example is given of an AV
driving closer (within its lane) to a smaller car on its left than to a truck on its right. This
choice reduces the risk to the AV, as a collision with a small car is safer for the AV
occupants than a collision with a truck. Another AV chooses differently, driving closer
to the heavier vehicle with more effective safety systems (Lin, 2015). This second AV
is optimising its driving position to reduce the overall risk it poses to other road users,
as if it collides with the truck this is less likely to result in injuries than a collision with
the car would be. A further variant on this situation is discussed in (Gerdes & Thornton,
2016). Other proposed situations include an AV choosing a “sacrificial” path, such as
placing itself to block the trajectory of a runaway vehicle (Lin, 2015)
3. Translating ethics into design
Considered as a body, these works presented in Section 2.2 provide two important
foundational results: how to work towards generating a set of ethical principles and how
to identify the AV behaviours resulting from these. However, they do not provide a
general mechanism for specifying the ethical principles, documenting the translation of
these into AV behaviours, or justifying that all the identified ethically-motivated
behaviours are in fact performed.
Formal verification, as shown in (Dennis et. al., 2004), (Winfield et. al., 2014),
(Vanderelst & Winfield, 2018), is a valuable contribution in this area. However, formal
verification of the entirety of a complex safety critical system – such as an AV – has
historically been considered infeasible due to cost, technical limitations, and perceived
difficulty ((Liu, Stavridou, & Duerte, 1995), (Knight, 2002), (Yoo, Jee & Cha, 2009)).
Moreover, such verification is also intended to demonstrate correctness according to the
specification only, and therefore does not consider wider issues of overall risk
reduction, regulatory compliance or errors due to requirements elicitation and
environmental change. Consideration of these issues is a legal requirement for safety-
critical systems (Health and Safety Executive [HSE], 2001).
Consequently, there is a need for a framework which specifically examines the
translation of ethical principles into AV behaviours, while considering the wider
principles of risk management of these behaviours. Our framework addresses this by
using structured assurance cases to fully express the ethical and risk requirements of the
system, and show how these requirements have been derived and met.
We begin by defining some terminology for use throughout. In the more
nuanced trolley problems discussed in Section 2.2.1, the behaviour of the AV is
motivated by the intent to reduce risk, whether this be to its own occupants or to other
drivers on the road. Such a motivation, of course, is more properly ascribed to the AV
developers rather than to the AV itself. This distinction highlights two interrelated areas
of application when considering the ethics of AVs: implemented ethics (the ethics
embedded within an autonomous system and realised in its behaviour) and engineering
ethics (the ethical principles and codes of practice followed by engineers). Making this
distinction allows us to interrogate the ethical behaviour of the AV without necessarily
considering the professional conduct of the developers, and vice versa.
3.1 Engineering ethics and implemented ethics
Engineering ethics refers to the professional ethical principles which are followed by
the developers of the AV during development work. These principles may be
represented by professional codes of conduct (Royal Academy of Engineering
[RAEng], 2017) as well as more general informal undertakings (Martin & Schinzinger,
2005).
Such ethical principles typically include criteria such as honesty, integrity,
respect for law and the public interest, accuracy, rigour, fairness and objectivity
(RAEng, 2017). However, they do not in themselves constrain the behaviour of any
resulting system on ethical lines. It is, however, plausible that following a code of
engineering ethics should prevent the developers from knowingly designing a system
that contravenes established ethical foundations (e.g. the Human Rights Act (UK
Government, 1998)).
Implemented ethics refers to the ethics embedded in the behaviour of the AV
itself, sometimes referred to as the “moral algorithm” (UK Autodrive, 2017b) or the
“machine ethics” of the AV. The implemented ethics determine how multiple risks are
balanced against each other, and how safety risk is balanced against considerations of
security, privacy, trust and capability. Different societies and stakeholders will differ in
their criteria for what behaviour is considered ethically acceptable, and this will also
vary across environments and domains of use.
3.2 AVs and ethical risk reduction
Arguments have been put forward (Kalra & Groves, 2017). that AVs should be
introduced as soon as their safety record is slightly better than traditional vehicles. Such
studies estimate 500,000 fewer overall road fatalities over a fifty-year time frame
compared to a conservative policy of AV introduction.
However, looking only at overall road fatalities obscures the distribution of such
fatalities, which is crucial from both an ethical and safety perspective. The introduction
of AVs may transfer risks even while reducing overall risk. That is, AVs may change
how different classes of people (e.g. human drivers, passengers, pedestrians) are
differentially exposed to risks. Any risk transfer also raises the question of risk consent,
and whether all affected parties have agreed to the redistribution of risk.
A complicating factor here is that informed consent requires an accurate
perception of the risk posed by the AV. Generally, perception of risk posed by a
machine (AV) vs that posed by a human (driver) is not uniform across society (Kim &
McGill, 2011), and in particular, those likely to perceive that AVs pose a lower risk
than human drivers are, paradoxically, those most likely to bear a greater proportion of
this risk due to their comparative lack of economic power.
Another complicating factor is the potential for AVs to contribute to risk
indirectly, as participants in the wider road network. For example, if AVs cause more
traffic jams, they may delay emergency vehicles, which may indirectly cause harm. As
above, this indirect harm may not be equally distributed across the population and,
moreover, may not be equally perceived by different segments of society.
A third factor in considering whether the risk posed by AVs is acceptable is the
timing of its behavioural decisions. Unlike a traditional car — where the decisions
during a crash are made in a time-critical frame — the intelligence in AV decisions is
sited during design and implementation. Removing these decisions from a time-critical
period argues that the resultant actions taken should be measurably better: that is, that
they should reduce the risk posed by an AV when compared to a human driver (Groves
& Kalra, 2017). This implies that it may not be acceptable for an AV to be merely “as
good as” a human driver ((Kalra & Paddock, 2016), (Holloway, Knight & McDermid,
2014)), but that in order for AVs to achieve societal acceptance they must present a
significantly lower risk than human drivers do.
The introduction of AVs which perform the majority of the driving task also
transfers ownership of much of the risk associated with this task. Currently the driver
owns much of this risk, system failure notwithstanding. However, for AVs at SAE
levels 4 and 5, it is possible that the developer will own nearly the entire risk associated
with the minute-by-minute driving decisions within the operational design domain.
Although the human passenger may still provide input into route choices, customisation
of driving techniques and overall usage, this would mean that AVs would be associated
with a significant ethical responsibility borne by an individual or entity – the
manufacturer and developer – not personally exposed to the resultant risk.
4 Ethics and risk balancing
As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the fundamental issues around ethics and safety of
AVs is the question of risk transfer, or risk balancing. It is the redistribution of risks
consequent on introduction of AVs which throws up the most complex ethical
challenges.
There is a legal requirement in the UK for the overall risk associated with a
system to be reduced As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The Health and
Safety Executive provides guidance (HSE, 2001) for good practice in reducing risk
ALARP and for demonstrating this.
For a minority of systems, the system risk can be reduced ALARP by reducing
the risk from each individual hazard ALARP. However, in cases where risk has been
transferred and redistributed (as with AVs), the situation is more complex. It is possible
to reduce a single risk at the cost of introducing another, or introduce a risk mitigation
which affects multiple risks at once. This means that it is possible for multiple different
system designs to all be ALARP, but for each to provide a different balance amongst
the individual system risks (Menon et. al., 2013). This can occur under the following
circumstances:
 When developers have not identified a complete list of hazards. This is relatively
likely during the initial deployment of AVs, as safety engineers will not have all
their usual tools for identifying and understanding hazards due to the lack of
established good practice and historical data.
 When there are interdependencies between hazards which are not adequately
accounted for. In these situations, some risks may be accounted for twice, giving
a false idea of the overall risk associated with the system. There may also be
interdependencies between systems and common mode failures which increase
the complexity of combining risks. Given the relative novelty of AV technology
and risk management, this is likely to be a significant issue.
 When multiple risk mitigations are not independent, and a mitigation for one
risk potentially increases other risks. For example, increasing the sensitivity of
algorithms which detect an object mitigates against the risk of failure to detect,
but increases the risk of erratic driving (the AV may brake unnecessarily to
avoid a “phantom” object) and therefore the likelihood of a collision.
 When a single risk mitigation affects multiple hazards. In this case, the cost of
the mitigation can be amortized over all the hazards and the resulting cost
judged reasonably practicable, where it would not when assessed against each
hazard individually.
 There are limited resources subject to a threshold effect of aggregation. For
example, in a SAE level 3 vehicle (i.e. one with supervising driver), operator
attention may be a mitigation against several hazards. When these hazards
present themselves simultaneously, the operator may be overwhelmed.
In circumstances where multiple different designs all present an overall ALARP system
risk, selecting any one of these designs represents a risk distribution choice. That is,
each design provides a different balance amongst the individual system risks, “trading
off” an increase in one risk for a decrease in another. This is an established practice in
the nuclear domain, with standards such as (HSE, 2006) and (Office for Nuclear
Regulation [ONR], 2018) emphasising the need to balance individual risks within a
system. However, outside the nuclear domain many safety guidance documents provide
little information on risk balancing and risk transfer, or require an explicit justification
of any risk trade-offs.
4.1 Ethical motivation for risk balancing
Where multiple different system designs all offer an overall ALARP risk, the final
choice may be made affected by a number of factors including cost, technical capability,
resource availability and ethical imperatives. The cheapest design may be chosen, or the
design which can be most easily implemented with the resources and technology at
hand. In these cases the justification is relatively simple and has long been part of
standard project management techniques (Office of Government Commerce, 2019).
However, the ethical principles behind selecting a design are not generally
explicitly discussed. Historically, there has been no mechanism to record ethical
imperatives which result in one risk being considered to be more important than
another. AVs in particular are vulnerable to the impact of such “hidden” ethical
priorities, as exemplified in the trolley problem. In its most simple form, where the AV
must choose between hitting one person or another, the developer might use ethical
principles to decide which of these is preferable. These will result in different system
designs, both of which present the same overall system risk.
The ethical complexities around AV operation and use have been discussed in
Section 2. Because these have the potential to result in different distributions of risk, we
consider that there is an obligation to provide information to the general public about
any ethically-motivated risk trade-offs that have been made. Visibility of this
information is necessary if affected stakeholders are to provide informed consent to the
risks that they bear as a result. For example, where a developer has chosen a system
design for the AV which prioritises the safety of passengers over pedestrians, this
decision – motivated by the ethics of self-interest – must be made clear to both
pedestrians and passengers. The framework we introduce in the following sections will
ensure that such risk trade-off decisions are documented and justified, and any
implications for the design of the AV are understood.
4.2 Refinement of risk factors
In order to provide explicit identification of those risk trade-offs which have
been made in response to ethical imperatives, we first consider the breakdown of risk.
Risk is typically calculated to be dependent on both the outcome and the likelihood of
this outcome
Risk = harm * likelihood
However, when assessing whether a risk trade-off is acceptable, we need greater
transparency into this calculation. In particular, we need sufficient information to fully
characterise and differentiate between risks, and therefore to justify why any given risk
trade-off or balancing has been performed. With this in mind, we propose that
assessment of risk for AVs should also consider the following factors.
a) The exposed population
We propose identifying several broad categories for the population who might
be harmed by the AV. These include both direct stakeholders (e.g. someone the AV
might collide with) and indirect stakeholders (e.g. someone affected by the emissions
from an AV driving in a particular style). Categories of stakeholders should be chosen
carefully, and some examples are likely to include:
 The AV passenger
 Other road users (e.g. other drivers, motorcyclists etc.)
 Pedestrians and cyclists
 Those living near the road
b)  Area of impact
This defines the area in which the harm is experienced. The area might refer to
the geographic area (the harm manifests close by vs harm manifesting further away) or
the time taken for harm (the harm manifests straight away vs harm manifesting several
years later). Some examples are:
 A crash causes geographically local harm (it harms pedestrians only in the
immediate area)
 A road bottleneck causes geographically wider harm (the traffic jam delays an
ambulance several streets away, causing harm to the patient)
 A crash causes harm that is close in time (the harmful effects of a crash are
typically experienced immediately)
 Cancer from use of carcinogenic AV fuel is distant in time (cancer may take
years to develop)
c) Causes
There may be specific risk causes which are of interest to an AV manufacturer.
For example, risks due to cybersecurity failings may be of interest to a manufacturer
developing AVs which rely on connected communication. Similarly, some risk causes
result in greater reputational damage than others, including risks caused by software
components which have been implicated in previous crashes.
4.3 Risk profiles and ethical positions
In this section we extend (Menon et. al., 2013) to present a taxonomy of ten different
ethically-driven approaches to risk reduction choices. Each of these approaches
describes a potential way to balance individual risks to achieve an ALARP system risk.
These approaches provide a means of interpreting ethical imperatives from the
perspective of safety management, and of making the risk trade-offs and balancing
explicit. We will refer to these approaches as risk profiles.
Eight of the profiles correspond to the factors presented in Section 4.2 as
constituting ethically-relevant characteristics of AV risk: likelihood, severity, exposed
population, area of impact and causes. In addition to this, we consider two risk profiles
which correspond to techniques for balancing risks. This set of profiles is not intended
to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as exemplars for the types of risk reduction decision
which may be made, and the motivations behind these.
Risk profile name Description
Likelihood risk
profile




This prioritises the reduction of catastrophic events, which may




This prioritises the reduction of risks which are likely to result in
harm to a certain defined segment of the population (e.g. children,
pedestrians).
Local risk profile This prioritises the reduction of those risks which are likely to
result in geographically local harm over those risks which are
more likely to result in harm at a greater distance, or where the
harmful effect is spread over a wider aspect of the road network.
Global risk
profile
This prioritises the reduction of those risks where the harm caused
eventuates at a geographical distance, and most likely within a
wider System of Systems (SoS).
Time-critical risk
profile
This prioritises the reduction of risks which may lead to immediate
harm over the reduction of risks where the harm occurs at some
point in the future.
Long-term benefit
risk profile
This prioritises the reduction of the long-term overall risk over the
reduction of short-term, immediate risks.
Risk causes
profile
This prioritises the reduction of risks that are due to particular










This prioritises achieving risk reduction that results in a similar
level of risk for all individual risks.
Table 1: Risk profiles and descriptions
4.3.1 Risk profile selection guidance
Because of the complexity of the ethical challenges around AVs, it may be the case that
multiple risk reduction profiles must be combined in order to capture all ethical
imperatives. The following table identifies some typical scenarios and the appropriate
risk reduction profile(s) for each. For each, we provide a justification as to why these
are the appropriate risk reduction profile(s) and a description of some possible
implementation actions the developers might take in line with these profiles. We note
that these actions are not the only way a developer might implement this risk reduction
profile, and emphasise that these are to be considered as illustrative examples only.
The scenarios have been selected by conducting a survey of existing work to
identify common ethical dilemmas and legal concerns ((Anderson & Anderson, 2007),
(Fagnant & Kockelman, 2014), (Arkin et. al., 2012), (Gerdes & Thornton, 2016), (Kalra
& Groves, 2017), (Kalra & Paddock, 2016), (Arman, 2018), (Thornton, 2018)). The
selection and combination of the correct risk profiles for a given situation remains a





For reasons of self-
interest (reputational
damage) developers want
to reduce the number of
accidents the AV is
involved in.
Likelihood Justification: A likelihood risk profile
prioritises the reduction of less harmful
but more common risks
Implementation: The drivers incorporate
a “steady driving” style which reduces
erratic driving at the potential cost of
including some rare false negative results
in object identification
For reasons of self-
interest (insurance)
developers want to
reduce the number of
accidents involving the
AV which result in one or
more fatalities.
Severity Justification: A severity risk profile
prioritises the reduction of those
collisions which result in the most severe
consequences.
Implementation: The developers achieve
this by increasing the sensitivity of object
detection, at the risk of decreasing the
efficiency of driving (due to an increased
number of false positives)
There is reputational
concern around being the
first AV to potentially
injure a child.
Exposure Justification: An exposure risk profile is
appropriate in situations in which there is
ethical or reputational concern about
exposing a particular segment of the
population to risk
Implementation: The developers choose
to prioritise the detection and avoidance






Out of altruism, the
developers want to
minimise disruption to
those people living in an
area where AVs can’t yet
travel, on the basis that
these people receive no
benefit from the AVs
Global Justification: A global risk profile is
appropriate when considering safety risks
which are propagated throughout a
system, and where the effect may be felt
at a distance from the risk origin (e.g.
traffic congestion, wider road safety).
Implementation: The developers choose
to implement travel algorithms which
minimise disruption at the boundary of
the AV-enabled areas which might
propagate outside these.




areas only, on the basis
that they have little
information about road
conditions outside these
and little obligation to the
population there.
Local Justification: A local risk profile
approach is most useful where the
interaction of risks at the system of
systems (SoS) level is either minimal or
difficult to quantify.
Implementation: The developers choose
to implement travel algorithms which are
best for the road network efficiency
within the AV-enabled area, and do not
consider the effect outside this
Out of concern for the
environment, the
developers want to meet
emission and carbon-
neutral targets.
Time-critical Justification: A time-critical risk profile
allows for the explicit balancing of risks
where the harm eventuates immediately
against risks where the harm eventuates
in the future.
Implementation: The developers may
choose to use fuel components with a risk
of lung-irritant emissions causing
immediate harm rather than components
with a risk of harmful environmental
emissions (all else being equal)




willing to accept some
immediate casualties if it




Justification: The long-term benefit
approach is based on questions raised in
standards such as (HSE, 2006), which
allow for the possibility of accepting a
higher short-term risk if this reduces the
risk long-term.
Implementation: The developers may
push to introduce AVs before sufficient
evidence exists to show that they are at
least as safe as a human driver. This
concept of accepting a short-term higher
risk is not current good practice (Menon,
2017), and therefore should only be used






For reasons of self-
interest (reputational
damage), the developers
want to avoid public
concern that the AV can
be “hacked” and
controlled remotely.
Risk causes Justification: A risk causes approach is
appropriate when developers prefer to
prioritise risks resulting from security
violations over risks resulting from other
concerns.
Implementation: This may lead
developers to choose a component which
offers better security updates over one
which offers better diagnostic accuracy
(all else being equal).
The developers want AVs
to offer a similar
improvement in safety to
every segment of the
population, compared to




Justification: The aim of this approach is
to reduce all risks associated with a
system by a certain minimum amount,
without considering the relative cost of
these reductions
Implementation: The developers may
make choices that ensure that the risk
posed by the AV to every party (cyclists,
pedestrians etc.) is reduced by a broadly
similar amount when compared to the
risk posed by human drivers.
The developers want AVs
to be significantly safer
than human drivers for






Justification: The aim of this approach is
to achieve a similar level of risk for all
individual risks, by reducing the highest
of these before addressing any lesser
risks.
Implementation: The developers may
make choices that will ensure the AV
prioritises detection and avoidance of
these vulnerable road users over that of
other AVs, in the event of a trolley
problem scenario.
Developers want to









Justification: These profiles together
prioritise risk reduction to a certain
segment of the exposed population who
are most likely to be economically
disadvantage (pedestrians, cyclists,
motorcyclists – but not AV passengers),
along with reduction of the highest risks
(again, those faced by pedestrians,
cyclists and motorcyclists).
Implementation: The developers will
prioritise detection and avoidance of
pedestrians, accepting the increase in






Developers want to avoid
giving passengers the








Justification: These profiles together
prioritise reduction of risks from a
specified cause (dynamic passenger
input), along with reduction of the highest
risks (resulting from the AV acting on
input from uniquely unqualified sources
such as child passengers). This is at the
cost of marginally increasing the risk
where the passenger is in fact competent
to provide input and has observed some
aspect of the environment (e.g. traffic
jam) that the AV has not.
Implementation: The developers may
choose to provide only fully-autonomous
modes of driving which do not permit any
input from the passengers.
For reasons of self-
interest (e.g. limit of
liability and insurance),
the developers want to
avoid any accidents
involving terrorist





Justification: These approaches together
prioritise reduction of risks from a
specified cause (security violations)
together with reduction of the highest
severity risks (those leading to multiple
fatalities)
Implementation: The developers may
choose to implement an autonomous
mode that’s operational only at low
speeds (reducing the chance of a
catastrophic crash), and also to push and
install security patches as soon as these
are released.
Table 2: guidance for selecting risk profiles
5. A structured assurance case for ethical principles
The risk profiles of Section 4 allow us to translate from ethical principles (e.g. “avoid
harming children”) to risk management decisions which affect the design and safety of
the AV system (“choose components better able to detect and distinguish between
children and adults”). In this way, the risk profiles encourage developers to make the
impact of ethics on the design explicit, by requiring a description of the risk balancing
and risk trade-offs which result from these ethics.
These risk profiles therefore provide us with a generalised mechanism to discuss
the ethics embedded in the design, the impact of these ethics on design and safety
decisions and the implications for risk management. Such a mechanism ensures
transparency, and ensures that stakeholders have been supplied with sufficient
information to consent to the proportion of risk that they bear, or to the imposition of
risk that they will be placing on other people by using an AV. The risk profiles also
allow traceability between ethical factors and design decisions, which is essential if
sufficient confidence in the adequacy of the eventual AV behaviour is to be achieved.
However, the risk profiles alone provide only a textual description, without the
ability to inform or link into the safety case. This can lead to information being lost or
not updated as required, and adds complexity to assessment of AV safety. To address
this issue, we present a methodology for linking the risk profiles and ethical information
to the safety case by using a template pattern within a structured assurance case.
5.1. Principles of ethics assurance cases
As discussed in Section 2, it is common for structured assurance cases to be founded on
the satisfaction of certain principles, and for these principles to be key to the safety
argument construction. Within the defence domain, there are four key principles that
must be satisfied within a safety argument (MOD, 2017). These have been introduced in
Section 2, and we have chosen to extend these into the area of ethics to form the key
principles of our structured assurance case dealing with ethics. These extended
principles are as follows:
P1. Ethics requirements appropriate for AV development and operation shall
be defined.
This requires that engineering ethics and implemented ethics
requirements should be explicitly defined, free from inconsistencies, and
containing sufficient detail to allow the other principles to be met.
P2. The intent of the ethics requirements shall be maintained throughout
decomposition.
This requires that the implemented ethics should be propagated
throughout the design of the system and refined into lower-level
requirements on design, implementation and risk management. The
engineering ethics should be satisfied throughout the system lifecycle.
P3. Ethics requirements shall be satisfied.
This requires that the ethics requirements, both implemented and
engineering, should be demonstrably satisfied and evidence provided to
support this.
P4. The AV shall continue to be safe, and emergent behaviour of the AV which
conflicts with the ethics requirements shall be identified and mitigated
This constrains emergent behaviour of the AV, either due to changes in
the environment or to adaptive algorithms used within the AV software.
Such emergent behaviours may not have been considered when
specifying the original ethics and safety requirements, and this principle
requires that evidence be provided to assure the continued safety of the
AV even in a changing environment.
There is a further principle relating to confidence in (MOD, 2015), which has no
immediate analogue to ethics, and which we do not develop further.
5.3. Ethics assurance case template
Using the principles P1 – P4 defined above, we can now construct a template pattern for
constructing an argument which satisfies these. This template pattern will make explicit
use of the risk profiles of Section 4 to translate between ethical requirements and safety
/ design requirements. The top-level claim is that the AV behaves – and continues to
behave – in a manner which is ethically appropriate for its environment.
We present this template pattern in Figure 1 using a diagrammatic notation (Goal
Structuring Notation (Assurance Case Working Group, 2018)), and discuss it textually
below.
Figure 1: ethical assurance template argument pattern
Claim A1: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented and adhered to
during the system lifecycle
This claim partially supports P3 and requires AV developers to demonstrate compliance
with an appropriate code of conduct, domain-specific good practice and existing ethical
precedents. This claim might reasonably be supported with records from audits and
artefacts from the development lifecycle, as well as documentation that developers have
followed processes defined in accordance with codes of professional conduct. This
claim helps to provide confidence in the integrity of any lifecycle artefacts which are
needed to support the top-level claim of Figure 1.
Claim B1: Implemented ethics compliant with the environment of use are adequately
specified.
This claim supports P1, and is broken down into two sub-claims as follows:
Claim B1.1: The implemented ethics are adequately specified
Specification of the implemented ethics may be achieved via identification and citation
of relevant items of regulation and policy, as well as the results of any public
consultation or ethical objections already tabled. It may also be useful to specify aspects
of implemented ethics via references to previous system designs, to academic papers,
and to accepted good practice. The specification of the implemented ethics must be
sufficient to address competing ethical motivations, and its adequacy must be explicitly
justified.
Claim B1.2: The implemented ethics comply with the legal, social and ethical norms of
the environment of use
The implemented ethics must be compatible with behaviour that would be reasonably
expected by the general public for an AV operating within the stated environment. It
should be noted that this does not necessarily imply an AV should behave in exactly the
same way as a traditional driver (IEEE Global, 2018), but rather that the AV should act
in a way that a traditional driver might plausibly expect from an AV.
Claim C1: The intent of the implemented ethics shall be maintained throughout
decomposition into AS design requirements and risk management decisions.
This claim supports P2, and serves to translate ethical requirements into lower-level
safety and risk management requirements which implement the ethical intent. It is
broken down into two sub-claims as follows:
Claim C1.1: Risk profiles reflecting the desired implemented ethics across different
environments have been specified
The risk profiles discussed in Section 4 provide a method of reflecting ethical
perspectives in risk management, risk balancing and risk distribution decisions.
Satisfaction of this claim requires that (a combination of) risk profiles have been
defined for all relevant scenarios, environment and operational lifecycle phases.
Claim C1.2: The design of the AV reflects the specified risk profile
This claim is supported by an argument that the risk balancing inherent in the specified
risk profile has been performed accordingly, via the translation of this risk profile into
technical, safety and risk requirements. It is broken down into three further sub-claims
as follows:
Claim C1.2.1: The selected risk profile has been decomposed into requirements on the
design and functionality of the system
This claim is supported by referencing out to the design and implementation
requirements specification, as well as to the safety case.
Claim C1.2.2: The design and functional requirements of the system are satisfied.
This claim is supported by referencing evidence provided within the safety case, which
is the primary mechanism for demonstrating satisfaction of design and safety
requirements.
Claim D1: The implemented ethics requirements are satisfied.
This claim partially supports P3 and requires identification of what the acceptable
ethical behaviour of the AV might be. Natural-language interpretation of the ethics
requirements will help support this claim, as will a description of the functionality and
behaviours which comply with these ethics. Supplementary supporting evidence will
include system verification and validation of the derived requirements sourced from the
ethical imperatives via risk profiles. Traceability between these derived requirements
and any further lower-level requirements must be demonstrated, along with traceability
between these derived requirements and verification artefacts.
Claim E1: Any conflicts between emergent behaviour of the AV and the implemented
ethics are identified and mitigated so far as is reasonably practicable.
This claim supports P4 and requires an estimation of likely emergent behaviours and
changes in the environment throughout the AV’s lifetime. Support for this claim
requires a gap analysis of potential environmental change, as well as of gap analysis
between the behaviours which may potentially be learnt by AVs (via adaptive
algorithms and continuous machine learning) and the behaviours which were “hard-
coded” or scripted at deployment. Any conflicts between the ethics requirements and
these new behaviours and environments must be identified and mitigated so far as is
reasonably practicable.
6. Discussion
The template pattern in Section 5 allows developers to argue that the behaviour of the
AV is ethically appropriate for its environment of use. It requires them to identify their
underlying ethical imperatives and how they have translated these into design decisions
by making use of the risk profiles. There is nothing in this template fragment itself to
constrain the developers’ ethical imperatives, so both “positive” (altruistic) and
“negative” (self-interested) ethical imperatives can be represented. This is a deliberate
decision to ensure that the structured assurance case has the capability to represent all
the relevant ethical aspects of the AV, rather than simply those which are the most
palatable to stakeholders.
We do note, however, that under Claim B1, developers are required to justify
that the implemented ethics comply with the legal, social and ethical norms of the
environment of use. Where developers have prioritised self-interest or reputational
damage (as shown in Section 4, e.g. “For reasons of self-interest, developers want to
reduce the number of accidents the AV is involved in”), it is likely that the justification
of the ethics behind this is comparatively weak. In such cases the subsequent AV
behaviour (e.g. a “steady driving” style reducing common low-speed accidents) may be
acceptable in itself, even if the ethics motivating it is not. By separating out the ethics
and the behaviours – and producing a template argument pattern which requires
developers to be explicit about both – we have ensured that stakeholder have
transparency into both the design decisions and the underlying ethics which motivate
these.
We have suggested possible items of evidence which might support each claim.
These are intended as illustrative guidance only and should not be considered
exhaustive. Template patterns do not typically constrain the evidence used in support of
claims, leaving this to best practice and the engineering judgement of the developers.
We do, however, note that – like safety – ethics is a limit concept (Kelly, Habli,
Nicholson, Megone & Mcnish, 2014). It is therefore it is not possible to state
definitively that an AV is “100% ethical”, and moreover, this will inevitably be a
subjective judgment. When interpreting or instantiating the template pattern, the top-
level claim should therefore be understood to apply only so far as is reasonably
practicable. This parallels the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) caveat for
system safety claims (HSE, 2001).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed how ethical factors can affect AV behaviour. These
ethical factors range from altruism on the developers’ part to self-interest, and can be
complex and contradictory. They affect risk management decisions, including risk
transfer, risk consent, risk acceptability and risk balancing. In particular, as seen in the
trolley problem, they can transfer risk from one section of the population and impose it
on another.
In order to make such ethical factors transparent, we have identified a
methodology for explicitly translating these into safety and design requirements, using a
structured assurance case. Such an assurance case enhances transparency, by ensuring
that the underlying motives which have led to individual AV behaviours are identified,
justified and explicitly discussed. In order to facilitate the translation of ethical
imperatives into risk management decisions we have identified risk profiles. These
describe approaches to risk reduction by considering those cases where risks are
balanced against each other, and a small increase in one risk is accepted for a
proportionate decrease in another.
We have presented a template argument pattern, which can be used within a
structured assurance case to construct an argument that the behaviour of the AV is
ethically appropriate. This template pattern draws on the risk profiles, requiring
developers to examine and explicitly identify the underlying ethical factors which have
motivated the AVs implemented behaviour. The template argument pattern allows for
expression of both altruistic and self-interested principles, and links to the safety case to
provide evidence that design decisions stemming from ethical requirements have been
met.
We propose to expand this work in future to apply the assurance case structure
to a working case study. This will allow us to develop further risk profiles in
conjunction with industry personnel. In order to achieve this, we will also consider
formalising certain ethical principles, including the principle of double effect and
Kantian ethics, along the lines of (Bentzen, 2015), (Linder & Bentzen, 2018). We will
also seek to identify a representative set of consequentialist ethics relevant to AV
introduction and operation, and demonstrate the feasibility of our assurance case
structure to represent this.
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